IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CO/3563/98

On Appeal from the High Court of Justice

Queen’s Bench Division

Divisional Court

 

(The Right Honourable Lord Justice Simon Brown

and the Honourable Mr Justice Penry-Davey)

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981

AND IN THE MATTER OF Geoffrey Harold Scriven

 

 

Between HER MAJESTY'S ATTORNEY-GENERAL Respondent/

Applicant

 

 

AND

 

 

GEOFFREY HAROLD SCRIVEN Appellant/

Respondent

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Take Notice that pursuant to the permission of the Court of Appeal dated the day of 2000 the Court of Appeal will be moved as soon as the above named Geoffrey Harold Scriven can be heard on appeal from the order of the Right Honourable Lord Justice Simon Brown and the Honourable Mr Justice Penry-Davey herein given at the hearing of the application for Civil Proceedings Orders against him on the 4 day of February 2000 whereby :-

IT IS ORDERED that the Applicant’s application herein be granted and that the said Geoffrey Harold Scriven be and is hereby prohibited from

1. instituting any civil proceedings in any Court by himself, agents or servants and

2. continuing any civil proceedings instituted by him in any Court before the making of this Order and

3. making any application other than an application for permission required by section 42 of the said Act in any proceedings instituted in any Court by any person unless Geoffrey Harold Scriven obtains the permission of the High Court having satisfied the High Court that the proceedings or application are not an abuse of the process of the Court in question and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings or application

 

 

For An Order that the Civil Proceedings Order of the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of Justice dated the 4 day of February 2000 be set aside.

AND that the costs of this appeal and below be the Appellant’s in any event.

And further take notice that the grounds of this appeal are :-

1. The Right Honourable Lord Justice Simon Brown was "disqualified" from being involved in hearing the application for a Civil Proceedings Order before the Divisional Court and/or there was occasioned a "real danger" of prejudice and bias by him being involved in hearing the said application.

2. The Right Honourable Judge was "disqualified" and/or there was occasioned a "real danger" of prejudice and bias thereby in the hearing of the said application because :-

(a) The Appellant requested him to withdraw from being involved in hearing the application and he wrongly refused to stand down as a result.

(b) He was "disqualified" from being involved in hearing the application and/or there was a "real danger" of prejudice and bias by him doing so as a result of being previously involved with the Right Honourable Lord Justice Balcombe in Scriven –v- Scriven in the Court of Appeal FC2/93/6078/R on the 8 day of July 1994 which had been adversely decided against him in relation to his divorce proceedings.

(c) Proceedings instituted by the Appellant arising out of the said Divorce proceedings in Scriven –v- Scriven formed a large part of the material before the said Divisional Court sought to be relied upon by HM Attorney-General in support of his application for a Civil Proceedings Order under section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

(d) As a result of the Right Honourable Judge being involved in the said proceedings in Scriven –v- Scriven in the Court of Appeal he was in effect acting as a judge in his own cause.

3. The Honourable Mr Justice Penry-Davey was also "disqualified" from being involved in hearing the application for a Civil Proceedings Order before the Divisional Court and/or there was occasioned a "real danger" of prejudice and bias by him being involved in hearing the said application.

4. The Honourable Judge was "disqualified" and/or there was occasioned a "real danger" of prejudice and bias thereby in the hearing of the said application because :-

(a) The Appellant requested him to withdraw from being involved in hearing the application and he wrongly refused to stand down as a result.

(b) He was "disqualified" from being involved in hearing the application and/or there was a "real danger" of prejudice and bias by him doing so as a result of being a former Chairman of the Bar Council of England and Wales.

(c) The Appellant had made a formal complaint about one Anthony Thornton QC in his capacity of President of the Professional Conduct Committee of the Bar Council of England and Wales in respect of whom articles had appeared in various newspapers at the material time alleging engagement in sexually deviant practices.

(d) The Appellant had outstanding a complaint to the said Professional Conduct Committee of the Bar Council of England and Wales against a Barrister one Sonia Gal who had appeared against him in Scriven –v- Scriven in the Court of Appeal FC2/93/6078/R on the 8 day of July 1994.

(e) The Appellant had complained to the said Professional Conduct Committee of the Bar Council of England and Wales that the said Sonia Gal had aided and abetted perjury and attempting to pervert the course of public justice committed by her instructing solicitors Davis Arnold Cooper incorporating Maurice Ruben Clare acting for his former wife in the said Divorce proceedings.

(f) As a result of the Honourable Judge being a former Chairman of the said Bar Council of England and Wales he was in effect acting as a judge in his own cause.

5. The "disqualification" of either or both the Honourable or Right Honourable judge aforesaid and/or the "real danger" of prejudice and/or bias arising out of their involvement in hearing the application before the Divisional Court resulted in the said court not being lawfully constituted as a Divisional Court to hear the said application under section 66(3) of the Supreme Court 1981 and/or Order 94 rule 15(1) RSC of Schedule 1 Part 50 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1999 and is liable to be struck down under the "Pinochet (No. 2)" and/or "Locabail" principle.

6. In the premises there was an unfair hearing before the Divisional Court in breach of the principles of "natural justice" and/or an unfair determination of the Appellant’s civil rights in breach of Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as incorporated in Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

7. The Divisional Court erred in law and/or acted without jurisdiction in making a Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant when :-

(a) The decision of the former HM Solicitor-General Lord Falconer of Thoroton to make the application for the said Civil Proceedings Order dated the 27 day of May 1998 abated on the 28 day of July 1998 when he ceased to hold office as a result of being replaced in the Government reshuffle by Mr Ross Cranston QC MP who became the new HM Solicitor-General.

(b) There was no evidence placed before the said Divisional Court that the said Ross Cranston QC MP acting under the Law Officers Act 1997 had re-authorised the proceedings to continue or had granted his approval of the previous decision thereto

(c) The instituting of the application for the Civil Proceedings Order after the 28 day of July 1998 by the issue of the Originating Motion sealed on the 17 day of September 1998 relying on the previous authorisation of the former HM Solicitor-General aforesaid was not protected by the provisions of section 17(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 which is only applicable after actual proceedings have been instituted per se.

8. In the premises there was no evidence or insufficient evidence placed before the Divisional Court that the application had thereby been "made" by the current HM Solicitor-General as required by the provisions of section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

9. In the premises the said Civil Proceedings Order was made without locus standii and/or without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and is a nullity ab initio with the result that it should be set aside ex debito justitiae by this Honourable Court.

10. The hearing before the Divisional Court was unfair as HM Attorney-General and the said court relied on hearsay evidence contained in the affidavit of the Treasury Solicitor sworn on the 9 day of November 1998 one Stephen Glendinning now deceased.

11. As a result thereof the said Stephen Glendinning was not available for cross-examination as to the contents of his affidavit by the Appellant.

12. The Appellant was denied "natural justice" by the Divisional Court declining to supply him as a result of his specific request with a copy of the "Bench Memo and/or summary" and/or "secret briefing" prepared for the court by the Crown Office lawyer and/or judicial assistants and/or by declining to inform him of its contents.

13. In the premises the Appellant was denied the opportunity of being in a position to know adverse details of any comments made against him to his prejudice and of being able to make adequate or full representations in rebuttal thereby.

14. In the premises the Appellant was denied "natural justice" thereby as a result of the judges comprising the Divisional Court hearing the application against him having been secretly briefed by officials for and on behalf of the Lord Chancellor the head of the Judiciary.

15. As a result thereof the hearing of the application was neither fair nor impartial in breach of Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as incorporated in Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

16. The hearing of the application for a "Civil Proceedings Order" before the Divisional Court against the 2 Appellant was not before a fair and impartial tribunal in breach of Article 6(1) of the of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms because :-

(a) The former Law Officers or their predecessors had been consulted regarding the appointment of both judges to the High Court bench.

(b) The former Law Officers and their predecessors were members of the government as was the Prime Minister and his predecessor and the Lord Chancellor and the former Lord Chancellor who also made recommendations regarding the appointment of both Right Honourable and Honourable judges to the High Court bench and made recommendations to the Prime Minister and is predecessor who thereafter made recommendations to Her Majesty the Queen regarding the appointment of Lord Justice Simon Brown as a Lord Justice of Appeal.

17. The Divisional Court erred in law in automatically making the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant for an indefinite period under section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 without specifically inviting and/or giving the Appellant an opportunity of addressing the court in relation to the said issue.

18. In the premises the Appellant was thereby denied "natural justice" by being denied "audi alteram partem" in respect of that specific issue and the making of the said Civil Proceedings Order against him is thereby rendered a nullity and should be set aside ex debito justitiae.

19. The Divisional Court further erred in law in automatically making the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant for an indefinite period under section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 which was disproportionate in effect without specifically considering whether such an Order was merited in all of the circumstances of the case.

20. In particular the Divisional Court failed to apply its mind to the applicability of the correct tariff in respect of the Appellant seriatim relating to whether his alleged vexatious civil proceedings constituted :-

(a) The least serious case not meriting an indefinite order.

(b) Middle of the road case not meriting an indefinite order.

(c) The worst and most serious case scenario meriting an indefinite order.

21. In respect of the Appellant this did not merit an indefinite order in any event under section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 as it did not constitute the most serious and worst case scenario and the Divisional Court completely failed to apply its mind to this factor at all.

22. The Divisional Court further wrongly exercised its discretion in making the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellant which was disproportionate in effect by barring the bringing of further actions in the future by him without the prior leave of the High Court which might be wholly unrelated to the actions taken into account by the Divisional Court and their subject matter.

23. In the premises the making of indefinite the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellants was rendered "Wednesbury" unreasonable and/or illegal and/or irrational and/or perverse and an unfair determination of his civil rights under article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms when the Divisional Court ought to have considered and utilised alternative remedies by way of Injunctions under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

Further or in the alternative:-

24. This Honourable Court should reconsider de novo pursuant to Order 59 rule 10(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Schedule 1 Part 50 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1999 whether the Civil Proceedings Order against the Appellants should be indefinite or for a set period of time under Section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

 

 

And further take notice that the Appellant proposes to apply to set down this Appeal in the Queen’s Bench Crown Office Final and New Trial List.

 

 

Dated the day of 2000

 

 

 

 

(Signed)

Geoffrey Harold Scriven,

Appellant in Person

c/o, Nasa,

85 High Street,

Cheadle

Cheshire

SK8 1AB

 

 

To the above-named Respondent and to

Treasury Solicitor

Queen Anne's Chambers

London

SW1H 9JS

Reference : L97/7915H/SG/L4

 

No notice as to the date on which this Appeal will be in the list for hearing will be given: it is the duty of solicitors to keep themselves informed as to the state of the lists. A respondent intending to appeal in person should inform the office of the Registrar of Civil Appeals, Royal Courts of Justice, W.C.2, of that fact and give his address; if he does so he will be notified at the address he has given of the date when the appeal is expected to be heard.

I/We certify that a true copy of this Notice

was served upon the Respondent’s

Solicitors on the day of , 2000

 

 

I/We cey

aaaaa

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Signed

CO/3563/98

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

On Appeal from the High Court of Justice

Queen’s Bench Division

Divisional Court

(The Right Honourable Lord Justice Simon Brown

and the Honourable Mr Justice Penry-Davey )

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF section 42(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981

AND IN THE MATTER OF Geoffrey Harold Scriven

 

 

HER MAJESTY’S ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Respondent/Applicant

v.

 

GEOFFREY HAROLD SCRIVEN

Appellant/Respondent

 

 

 

 

Notice of Appeal

 

 

 

 

 

Geoffrey Harold Scriven,

c/o, Nasa,

85 High Street,

Cheadle

Cheshire

SK8 1AB

Appellant in person

 

 

 

Attorney General v Scriven (Queen's Bench)
SCRIVEN - SKELETON ARGUMENT (COURT OF APPEAL)
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