Royal Courts of Justice Strand

London WC2

Friday, 28th November 1997

B e f o r e:




- - - - - - -




- - - - - - -

(Computer-aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of

Smith Bernal Reporting Limited,

180 Fleet Street,

London EC4A 2HD

Telephone No: 0171-831 3183

Fax No: 0171-831 8838

Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

- - - - - -

The Applicant appeared in person.

MR M SHAW (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.


(as approved)

Crown copyright

Friday, 28th November 1997

LORD JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: Before the Court today are a number of applications. The first and most substantive one is an application by the Attorney General under section 42 of the Supreme Court to have the Respondent, Mr Haralabidis, make the subject of a Civil Proceedings Order. There is a Cross Notice of Motion by Mr Haralabidis, but I need not turn to that just yet because it is common ground that that should be heard after the Attorney General’s section 42 application.

There are, however, applications by Mr Haralabidis for various things which should be dealt with prior to the Attorney General’s motion. He took out a summons on 16th September which reads as follows:

“Let all parties concerned attend the judge at the Royal Courts of Justice Strand London... for the hearing of an application by the respondent for an order that:

1- This action be transferred to Manchester District Registry on the grounds that the respondent is disabled and cannot travel everyday to London and to carry the files of 18 cases, and that

2- The applicant do serve the respondent with copies of the evidence upon which the applicant was persuaded to start this action, together with the names of the persons who have submitted this evidence and have requested the applicant to start this action.

3- [relates to costs.]”

That summons was supported by an affidavit by Mr Haralabidis in which he says this:

“I deny categorically all the accusations made against me by the applicant and I am challenging him to prove his accusations in a fair hearing, in open court, before impartial and law abiding judicial officials and not in a Kangaroo hearing behind closed doors as I have experienced, with few exceptions, in the last six years.

I accuse the applicant that he has entered into a collusion with the Lord Chancellor’s Department, and other Government Departments, to take this action against me for to stop my legal actions, as the Lord Chancellor’s Department have been made aware that I have exposed their latest malpractices, and that neither the applicant nor anybody else have any evidence to justify in law, or in fact, or in reason, this action against me, and that the accusations against me are false and malicious, and that this action against me is an abuse of power, and an abuse of the process of the court, and the result of conspiracies, and I can, and I shall prove all this in a fair hearing, in open court, before impartial and law abiding judicial officials.

I accuse Judicial officials and the court staff in every court level that they have committed perpetual conspiracies to pervert the course of justice and crimes against me personally in order to cover up initially child abuse, and drugs, and other serious crimes, and thereafter in order to cover up with the previous unlawful acts, and so on, in a never ending cycle.

I accuse the Lord Chancellor and members of his department, including members of his private office and the court service that they have refused to respond to my numerous reports to stop the criminal acts against me and justice and to discipline and to remove the offenders from their positions of public trust and that they have sanctioned and supported these crimes.

I accuse the applicants and members of his private office that they have refused to respond to my numerous reports and requests to take action against the offenders and so stop the crimes against me and justice, and that they have sanctioned these crimes and have allowed the offenders to continue their offences against me and against justice with impunity.

I accuse the previous administration, and the present one, that they have refused to respond to my numerous reports and requests to stop these crimes and to discipline and remove the offenders from their positions of public trust, and that they have allowed these crimes to continue.

All these facts prove that child abuse, drugs and other serious crimes are organised and supported by persons in positions of authority and by the courts, and that the courts organise and commit themselves crimes against members of the public, who go to the courts in good faith asking for the protection of their children and for justice, under the support of the Lord Chancellor and of the applicant and of the prime minister’s office.”

Then he says:

“If the applicant and the Lord Chancellor intend to allow me a fair hearing, in open court, before impartial and law abiding judicial officials, I am asking, a) For the case to be transferred to Manchester and I am disabled and I cannot travel everyday to London and to carry the files of 18 cases, b) To send from London experienced and impartial judicial officials to conduct the hearing, and not judicial officials who have been involved in previous hearing in my cases,

c) To order the applicant, as per the rules for discovery, to forward to me copies of the evidence upon which the Solicitor General first and the applicant later have based this action against me together with the names of the persons who have submitted these evidence and have asked the Solicitor General and the applicant to start this action.

In view of the number of the cases cited by the applicant and his solicitor and of my own accusations a fair hearing is likely to last for many weeks.”

If I can deal firstly with the application that there should be interrogatories as to the persons who have prompted the Attorney General to apply for a Civil Proceedings Order. Mr Haralabidis says, and I am in no position to accept or reject the truth of this, but I am prepared to work on the basis that it is true, that various people have asked the Attorney General to start these proceedings, including, says Mr Haralabidis, Newman J at some stage. That in itself is not at all surprising. Practically every application under section 42 springs from someone, or other, very often judges in this Court or the Court of Appeal, saying to the Attorney General: “Will you consider whether this is an appropriate case to apply for an order of this kind?” That is commonly done and there is nothing peculiar about what Mr Haralabidis says has happened to him in this regard.

Who makes the complaint to the Attorney General, or whether those persons were motivated by malice or a desire to save themselves expense, is all of no relevance to the task before the Court when hearing an application by the Attorney General under section 42. Our task then is to see whether the tests set out in the section are themselves satisfied. Therefore, on that basis the interrogatories asked for are not ones for which I would give leave. They are irrelevant to the issue before us.

Returning to the summons, the request that the Applicant serve the Respondent with copies of the evidence, upon which the Applicant was persuaded to start this action, covers exactly the same point. For the same reason, I would refuse that request.

We then come to the application that the action be transferred to Manchester District Registry upon the ground that the Respondent is disabled and cannot travel every day to London to carry the files of 18 cases. Here one has an initial sympathy for a disabled Applicant for whom coming to London is clearly a great difficulty. He says that the hearing which is starting today, if we carry on, will last for a number of weeks and that he cannot afford a hotel so he wants the Courts, if they are only prepared to sit in London, to authorise the expense of his staying in a hotel. He tells us, and this is fortuitous, that he has not actually brought the files which he wished to have with him in Court because he left his briefcase behind (I think that is the rather shorter material) and that there is a vast amount of material going to a whole variety of matters which are not relied upon by the Attorney General, but to which he, Mr Haralabidis, would wish to refer.

The counsel for the Attorney General, Mr Mark Shaw, has placed before the Court, and before Mr Haralabidis, a skeleton argument in which he seeks to set out a chronology of various things that happened and Mr Haralabidis makes a point that there are things missed out of that chronology. For my part, I am quite prepared to believe that for the purpose of this application.

In paragraph 5 of the skeleton argument, in the introduction to his submissions, Mr Shaw submits that in common with many proceedings under section 42 of the 1981 Act the litigation, which has led to this application, stems from a specific underlying event. The underlying event has given rise to a sense of grievance which may initially have been understandable, but which has been, and still is, pursued obsessively and oppressively. He submits that in the present case the Respondent’s complaints originate in his divorce in Manchester in the early 1990s and the loss of the custody of his children.

Mr Haralabidis says that is not right and that he has a number of complaints which have founded his various actions which have no direct connection with his divorce at all. Again, for my part, I am prepared to proceed on the assumption that Mr Haralabidis is quite right about this and Mr Shaw was wholly wrong.

Mr Shaw put before the Court a list, as is customary in these cases of, as it turns out, some 18 actions in each of which it is alleged by the Attorney General Mr Haralabidis acted vexatiously. In this type of case it is very common for the Attorney to put forward a whole number of cases, then for the Court to decide that at least in relation to some of them the Respondent has not behaved vexatiously, but that in relation to others that he has. Of the list presented by the Attorney General there are a number, namely nine, which have been struck out and, as it seems to me, a sensible way ahead initially is to concentrate on those actions which have all been struck out on the basis that they disclose no reasonable cause of action.

There are other matters which are relied on by the Attorney General, but I apprehend that it is a sensible way ahead initially, in particular, in the light of the difficulties to which Mr Haralabidis has drawn our attention, to consider those actions. As it seems to me, in order to do that all one needs to do is to look at documents emanating from Mr Haralabidis himself: the way he phrased his cases against the persons concerned. Those documents are before the Court and have been before Mr Haralabidis. Evidence of facts is not relevant to a consideration of those matters and, in those circumstances, it seems to me that they can be dealt with fairly swiftly and can be dealt with today.

As I see it, there is no need to adjourn these matters to be dealt with on innumerable days in London with the vast expense to Mr Haralabidis and others that follow from it, but that we can deal with those matters today and, I apprehend, that is the way forward. We can then decide whether or no it is necessary for the Court to investigate all the other matters. If we come to the conclusion that it is, then we can deal further with the future scheduling of this action.


LORD JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: Therefore, Mr Haralabidis, what we propose to do now is simply to go ahead with the actions which have been struck out and consider those first and then we can consider whether that is enough to enable us to make up our minds one way or another and, if not, what we should do.

Friday, 28th December 1997

MR JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: Before the Court is an application by the Attorney General for an Order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, and, in particular, a Civil Proceedings Order against Nicholas Haralabidis. In a judgment delivered earlier today we indicated that Mr Haralabidis had wanted an adjournment of the present case and that we refused it. I direct that the judgment I gave at that time be appended to the judgment I am now delivering.

THE APPLICANT: What does it mean? Excuse me interrupting you but I am a little bit lost here: the earlier judgment?

MR JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: I said I direct that it be appended to what I am saying now so I do not have to say it all over again. From that it will be apparent that the Court decided initially to hear what Mr Haralabidis had to say in relation to a number of actions which he has lodged and which have been struck out.

We have, for the best part of a day, listened to what he has said in relation to those various actions which he has done politely and with force. It is useful if we look at the first one which is 1993 H94O2. The claim is for £150,000 damages and I quote from the Statement of Claim:

“... for conspiracy to deprive me of my right to access to justice at the expense of my children’s safety and of my claim against the South Manchester Health Authority and for violations of the rules and for abuse of power and oppression, and for depriving me of my right to access to justice...”.

The second application is 1995 H10352 where the Plaintiff is Mr Haralabidis and the Defendant is described as “Manchester County Court, Family Division, The Attorney General.” The Statement of Claim reads as follows:

“The Plaintiff claim is for £5,000,000 damages for me and £5,000,000 damages for my children for refusing to implement the laws, for oppression, for repeated violations of the procedure, for abuse of power to cover up crimes and criminals and to prevent the protection of my children from druggings and physical and sexual abuse. For ignoring the evidence which established the need to protect my children, for conspiracy to declare me insane and abandon the hearing at the expense of my children’s safety and mine and justice after the need to protect my children was established with documented evidence and witnesses, for repeated conspiracies to pervert the course of justice at the expense of my children’s safety, for violating court orders, for ensuring the continuation of the crimes against my children and for telling me that it is in my daughter’s interest to do so, for refusing me access to justice, for subjecting me to inhuman or deals.

The third of these actions is 1993 H1053 and the Defendant is the Official Solicitor. The Statement of Claim is for:

“£2,000,000 damages for me and £2,000,000 for my children for violating my children’s right to be heard and for conspiring to act against their interest and to prevent their protection from druggings and physical and sexual abuse. For conspiracy to declare me insane...

The Official Solicitor was appointed Guardian ad Litem by the court on 29. 5. 92 not to look after my children’s interest and their safety but to cover up the crimes against them and to attempt to declare me insane.”

The next one is against DL Sellers and Company who are shorthand writers the Statement of Claim reads:

“The Plaintiff’s claim is for £500,000 damages for me and £250,000 damages for my children for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and for perverting the course of justice by altering and omitting the evidence in the transcript D L Sellers and Co prepared from the Court tapes of the hearing on 30/6/92 and 01/07/92 at Manchester County Court at the expense of my children’s safety and for conspiracy to cause me criminal damage by inserting in the transcript that I hate Great Britain and the British people.”

The next is 1993 H 10355 against Barry Hart described as the Guardian Ad Litem. The Statement of Claim reads:

“The Plaintiff’s claim is for £400,000 damages for me and £400,000 damages for my children for conspiring to cover up the crimes of drugs and physical and sexual abuse against my children for submitting false reports for insinuating I have imagined crimes in order to cover up his exposing of my children to these crimes. For violating the rules and not appearing in court to give evidence and explain the reasons for his reports and actions.

Barry Hart was appointed Guardian for my children by the Official Solicitor, not to look after my children’s interest and safety but to cover up the crimes against them.”

The next one is something which appears on a County Court summons form which was filled in by the Plaintiff, but which he says he did not actually have issued, which is addressed to Quentin Edwards at Central London County Court; Quentin Edwards being a Circuit Judge there. What the document says is:

“My claim against the defendant is for the damages he has caused me to suffer with his breach of duty and his numerous violations in his unlawful handling of the hearing of my action against the Department of Transport.”

The particulars are:

“At the hearing of my action against the Department of Transport on 29-2-96 case No CL 570 698 the defendant breached his duty and abused the powers of his office and his judicial privilege and he denied me justice and threatened me and he oppressed me and he insulted me repeatedly despite my warnings and he violated my rights and the Court Rules repeatedly and deliberately for to cover up the unlawful acts of the Department of Transport. My claim is against the defendant in person and not against the Lord Chancellor’s Department.”

The next one is 1996 H4517 and the Defendants are District Judge Griffiths and AG Hampton. AG Hampton being, as I understand it, the Chief Clerk at Manchester County Court and at the District Registry. The Statement of Claim there is for:

“£100,000 exemplary damages for breach of duty, abuse of power, oppression and conspiracy to deny justice contrary to Constitutional and Administrative Law and to the Common Laws.

In particular

AG Hampton refused to abide by the court order of 17-3-95 and list my application to consolidate my action 93 H 9291 with action 93 H 9403 and for further directions for hearing of the court’s own motion for one full year and in so doing he has denied me justice.

After my repeated requests he listed my application for hearing on 19-3-96 before District Judge Griffiths contrary to my objections and to the order of 18-10-94 made by DJ Griffiths in case No. 93 H 9291 for my cases not to be listed before him.

AG Hampton listed my application before Mr Griffiths on purpose to provoke me and to cause further delay. If I object, and if I do not object to render myself defenseless to Mr Griffiths’ unlawful acts.

On 19-3-96 Mr Griffiths instead of consolidating the actions and giving further directions asked the solicitors for the defendants to address him for to have my action dismissed.

The two solicitors stated that they were there for the consolidation and for directions and that they had no idea about applications to have my actions dismissed. In case 93 H 9291 such application was dismissed on 3-5-94. Mr Griffiths persisted and asked them whether they had copies of the Official Solicitor’s report following District Judge ER Jones’ own malicious accusations and conspiracy to have me declared insane and incapable of managing and administrating my affairs and for the Official Solicitor to be appointed my ’next friend’ to take control of my affairs i.e. my legal actions.

The solicitors stated that they had no copies of this report and no idea of its existence.

Following the collapse of his conspiracy ER Jones had refused to forward to me a copy of this report on the grounds that it was confidential.

Mr Griffiths had a copy of this report and he was proposing to make it available to the defendants.

My actions against the defendants are for failing their duties and for conspiracy and for conspiring to have me declared insane.

I objected again to Mr Griffiths hearing my application and to his conduct.

Mr Griffiths threatened me with contempt of court because of my objections and I left the court. In my absence Mr Griffiths ordered me unlawfully to pay the defendant’s costs and he adjourned the hearing and he reserved it to himself thus abusing the power of his office to oppress me and to blackmail me to concede to him hearing my application so that he can repeat his unlawful acts against me and justice. Mr Griffiths has informed me that the court has lost the file in case 93 H 9291, that is A G Hampton.

The idea of going to the courts for to have justice and not to suffer more violations.”

The next case is 1996 H5369. The Defendant is the same: Mr Hampton. The Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim reads:

“The Plaintiff’s claim is for £200,000 exemplary damages for breach of duty, abuse of power and for conspiracy in tort to deny the Plaintiff access to justice.

In particular

The defendant in his capacity as the Chief Clerk of the Manchester County Court has refused to list the Plaintiff’s applications for hearing and he has denied the Plaintiff access to the Court and to justice with his letter of 13-6-95.”

The last of these cases is a case to which the Defendant is intended to be Owen J, albeit that he is described as Judge D Owen. That is a confusion which I can well understand and upon which nothing turns. The Statement of Claim reads:

“The Plaintiff’s claim is for £100,000 exemplary damages for breach of duty.

In particular

Judge D Owen refused me on 23-5-96 the protection of the law and he stated that he is not satisfied that there is any need to order the investigation of my parents’ murder, and other murders, and child abuse, and the assassination attempts against me and other serious crimes, and the crimes committed against me and against justice by judicial and administrative officials, and by others, during the course of legal proceedings. In so doing Judge D Owen has acted contrary to constitutional law and to the Common Laws and to his legal obligations to order the investigation of murders, child abuse and drug crimes.”

The history of what has happened to these various actions is, I strongly suspect, not wholly before us. Apart from the affidavit by Mr Haralabidis, which I read out in my earlier judgment, Mr Haralabidis has filed no further evidence by way of affidavit. He indicated to us that he had volumes and volumes of evidence which he wished to place before the Court and when he finished addressing us on these actions, to which I have just made reference, he asked the Court to adjourn matters so that he might produce this evidence. I do not think he said that he was going to put it in affidavit form. I do not doubt he would have been willing to do whatever the Court suggested.

Before saying more about that application, it is perhaps right to go through these actions to indicate what, in very broad terms, he has told us. Much of which has, as things stand at the moment, no evidential basis, though we are not in a position to make any finding as to whether it is right or it is wrong. For better or for worse we have not asked counsel for the Attorney General to address us further on the matter, assuming that the material in the bundle is all the material that was to hand in the Attorney General’s office.

In relation to the first of these actions, H09402, the point which was made by Haralabidis is that although the action was struck out by District Judge Fairclough, and although he applied to appeal that judgment, (only very marginally out of time) he has not had that appeal listed, although he has asked for it. He claims that this is evidence of the conspiracy against him. That said, one sees the force of what he says.

As it seems to me all the Statements of Claim that I have read fall far short of complying with Order 18 as to what should be in a pleading. It is important that parties when they start litigation should do what the order suggests, namely make separate allegations in separate paragraphs to which a Defendant can plead so that the issues between the parties can appear. If one has allegations of conspiracy which do not identify the conspirators, then it is very difficult for anybody to plead to them. That is what happened in relation to action 4.

In relation to action 7, it seems, from the Court record, that the action was struck out by District Judge Freeman, that there was then an appeal to Morison J, who dismissed the appeal, and there was then an application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal, which was dismissed. Mr Haralabidis told us, and it sounds, if I may say so, very probable, that he was only allowed 20 minutes or so in the Court of Appeal. That is the time which is allowed for these type of applications so he is not treated worse than anyone else, but one understands the difficulty of anybody preparing a case. What he says that he wants to do is to start again to show, if I understood him correctly, that his wife murdered his parents, and he claims that a variety of things have gone badly wrong with the judicial process.

In the next action 10353 against the Official Solicitor a summons was taken to strike that out. The Official Solicitor supported that summons with an affidavit which can be found in the file by a Deputy District Judge in Manchester. There seems some dispute about his name but no dispute about what he did: he struck out the Plaintiff’s claim. There was then an appeal on the basis that:

“... the deputy district judge has acted partially unreasonably and unlawfully in that he has deliberately ignored the documentary evidence which exposed the defendant’s unlawful acts, and proved the lawful cause of my action, and his counsel’s false and unlawful submissions, and that the deputy district judge did not allow me to finish my submissions and he used unlawfully the court’s inherent jurisdiction to strike out my action and cover up the defendant’s unlawful acts.

There was an appeal to Morland J which he dismissed.

Mr Haralabidis says that the judge was wrong to dismiss that appeal. He tried to appeal to the Court of Appeal. However, the applications were listed before Butler-Sloss LJ and Hutchison LJ and either both of them or just Butler-Sloss LJ, I am not quite sure, heard appeals in relation to his children on 4th April 1995. According to Mr Haralabidis the Lady Justice had stated that various judges in various dealings with Mr Haralabidis’ children, and indeed with himself, had acted wrongly. Therefore, he was full of hope when he appeared before the same Lady Justice on his leave application. However, the Court refused leave to appeal.

He said that she said that she had not read all of the four documents which he submitted in support of his application for leave to appeal, and he submitted to us that it was wrong for her to have refused leave to appeal. He said that he had, indeed, evidence to prove that the Lady Justice was not merely wrong but had committed a crime against justice. I am not quite sure whether that is a separate matter or just two ways of saying the same thing.

In relation to the next two matters they really go together, that is to say action H 10354 and H 10355. I say they go together because procedurally they were heard by the same judges at each level of the Appellate process and were so considered together. What has happened is that they have worked their way up the Appellate process and in each case leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal has been refused.

Mr Haralabidis made the point to us that it might be that the Court had said rather that he had a right to issue criminal proceedings, but that he did not have any right to issue civil proceedings. We do not have in front of us precisely what the Court said. He claims that it was illogical to take that line. He said that although he was a man who was determined to do whatever he could within the legal process, the way his affairs have been handled, largely up in Manchester but to a degree in London by the Crown Office and the Court of Appeal Office, were such that it appeared to him that the authorities were trying to force him to take the law into his own hands and to kill his wife. I certainly gained the impression that the unfortunate Mr Haralabidis has, in any event, arrived at a state where he is having difficulty in coping with the many problems which life has thrown at him.

The next action is the one against His Honour Judge Quentin Edwards. This is something of an oddity because according to Mr Haralabidis while the document that I have read out was, indeed, drafted by him, what happened was that without him asking for it someone in the County Court Office ordered that the action be transferred to the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division. There it proceeded, notwithstanding the fact that according to Mr Haralabidis he had given instructions to the appropriate people in the County Court to withdraw this summons because he did not want, at that stage, to proceed with it. Yet the summons went on its merry way.

There was, in due course, a summons to strike it out and, so far as one can see from the Order which appears in our documentation, being dated 10th July, in the absence of Mr Haralabidis the Plaintiff’s summons and action were struck out and dismissed. He was ordered to pay the judge’s costs and he says: “Well, this is absolutely monstrous. I did not want this action to go on. It does go on and is struck out and I am ordered to pay the costs.”

He then made various other applications which came to light in the course of the hearings in relation to that, but upon which the Attorney General does not rely. That was the action in relation to His Honour Judge Quentin Edwards.

So far as the action No. H04517 is concerned, that and the other two actions, which I have mentioned, all landed up in front of Colman J in July 1996. Mr Haralabidis

was upset that they were all heard together, and moreover heard together at rather short notice to Colman J on the very last day of term. He says, in relation to the action against District Judge Griffith’s, that what he is complaining of is effectively that the District Judge and others came together and listed the case wrongly in front of the wrong judge, refused to list it when he wanted to, and made wrongful Orders as to costs.

He says that at one stage he managed to get judgment in default of a defence because the Defendants had not moved fast enough, and then at the moment he had done that on the very same day, the same afternoon, without any warning to him, that was set aside at the request of the District Judge. He says this is bad justice when he was not even told about it, and he has various other complaints about it which he explains, I do not doubt, in front of

Colman J.

However, even Colman J struck out his actions, both this one and the other two that I have mentioned. I say this in relation to the very last action against Owen J. Mr Haralabidis submitted to us (as he had submitted to Owen J) that Owen J was in dereliction of his judicial duty in failing to order an investigation into various alleged criminal activities of which the Applicant had allegedly furnished him with evidence. It is right to say that judges do not have power, in ordinary civil proceedings, to order an investigation into criminal offences. They do have the power to refer matters to the Attorney General for investigation and occasionally do so.

The root problem that Mr Haralabidis faces in these actions, as it seems to me, is that he has failed to distinguish between two rather separate matters. Question (1) is whether or no he has a legitimate ground of complaint against this or that person for doing that which he ought not to have done, or failing to do that which he ought to have done. Question (2) is a very different question and that is whether or no the proceedings, as constituted by Mr Haralabidis, are properly constituted in the sense that one looks at them and sees that they set out in a clear manner a ground of action which has a chance of success: a ground of civil action.

As one can see if one is trained in the law, in a number of these matters, such as those relating to a failure to refer crimes to the Attorney General, listing things wrongly, or alternatively something done by the judge whilst he was sitting on a case, these are matters that do not give rise to a civil right of action. In relation to a number of these cases which have come before us and which I have set out, the Statement of Claim is manifestly hopelessly inadequate to launch sensible civil proceedings. It is this difficulty which faces Mr Haralabidis who says, no doubt absolutely rightly, that he is not a skilled lawyer and the precise form of any particular complaint should not matter. That is right. Of course there is a certain amount of liberty given to litigants in person, but how much is to be given varies from case to case and what the case requires.

The striking out, which has happened in these cases, is, as I see it, wholly independent of any evidence either by Mr Haralabidis or, indeed, by his many proposed Defendants. It turns on the form of the proceedings and the type of allegations that are made. In those circumstances the desire by Mr Haralabidis to put very many more documents before the Court is nothing to the point because further evidence, while it may well substantiate his central ground of complaint which gave rise to the proceedings, cannot possibly justify the form of the proceedings which were taken. This Court has, of course, to face the fact that where it has been held that a person’s conduct in proceedings has been vexatious, that finding cannot be challenged in this Court (see Attorney General v Jones [1991] 1 WLR 859 where Lord Donaldson considered the matter).

I have applied my mind anxiously to the test which is set out in the section as expanded by the various cases which have come before the Courts, and, as it seems to me, this Court can be satisfied that Mr Haralabidis has habitually and persistently, and without any reasonable ground, instituted vexatious civil proceedings and the precondition for the making of this Order seems to me to be amply fulfilled. However, the Court has a jurisdiction, and a discretionary jurisdiction, as to whether or no to make such an Order and I have applied my minds to whether or no the present is a case where an Order ought to be made. For my part, having heard Mr Haralabidis I am satisfied that it would be right so to do. I am confirmed in the correctness of that view by the various applications he has made in the present proceedings.

I mention now something which does not arise for decision, I think, today, although I could hear argument to the contrary, and that is a Cross Notice of Motion which he filed for hearing before this, and to which I referred in my judgment earlier on today. In that he asks for an Order that:

“(1) all the persons proven guilty by me during the hearing of the criminal offences described in my affidavit of 18-9-97 do stand trial for their crimes;

(2) my former wife and her criminal associates do stand trial for their crimes, which include multiple murders child abuse assassination attempts against me drugs thefts fraud and other serious crimes.

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that I shall prove all my accusations against my former wife and her criminal associates, and against the persons in the authorities named in my affidavit of 18-9-97, with undisputed evidence in official documents in the files of all the cases you have cited, and which documents you have withheld from the Divisional Court.”

That is the end of the Notice of Motion.

I fear that is the style of proceedings which, as it seems to me, can be described as being vexatious civil proceedings for the reasons that I have indicated, and as a matter of discretion I would make the order.


MR SHAW: My Lord, there is of course no application for costs in relation to this, or in relation to the matters your Lordship has dealt with this morning. Can I simply mention two points of housekeeping in relation to the wording of your Lordship’s judgment? There was one word in relation to action 10 which your Lordship could not decipher from the Statement of Claim. I think the word was “irrelevant”. In relation to action 17 your Lordship said “individual and administrative officials” at one point. I believe it should be “judicial administrative officials”.

MR JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: I am obliged to you. Thank you. I think, so far as the Cross Notice of Motion is concerned, formally it could not proceed without leave being given by a High Court Judge, but it might be more sensible for us to deal with it now.

MR SHAW: I think it would be, my Lord, given that we all realise what it is about.

MR JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: Mr Haralabidis, so far as the general matter was concerned, I am afraid you have lost. I hope you felt you had a sympathetic hearing. So far as the Cross Notice is concerned, I have explained the situation to you but really the Court has no power to make that type of Order, do you understand?

THE APPLICANT: Yes, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: The most sensible thing I would have thought would be for me to dismiss it now. You have made the application effectively to the Attorney General to investigate these matters. He is the person in charge of the crime, you see.

THE APPLICANT: Your Lordship, you have made the Order. That is the end of the matter. I take it, as you have said, you also dismiss my Cross Notice of Motion. That is understandable. It does not surprise me at all. I was expecting that and I did say that in my communications with the Head of the Crown Office and in my affidavit applications. Because the hearing is over the thing that surprises me a little bit (and it is entirely within your own good intentions whether you like to reply or whether you do not) is if a person is forced to swallow murders of his parents and abuse of his children and if the Authority says: “If you say anything or if you do anything we will either try to declare you insane if you fail that group -- and if you fail that, vexatious litigant”, what are the normal options available to a normal person to act in front of such not just oppression, blatant criminal activity?

MR JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: I do not think it would be right, I am afraid, for this Court to give impromptu advice from the Bench.

THE APPLICANT: I am not asking for advice here I am saying you make your Order -- I knew that you would make that Order -- but if the order is correct that means to me I have to go to the Court hearing, have a judicial official committing crimes against me, having no right to appeal against his criminal Orders, having no right to report him to the appropriate authorities, having no right to go to a higher Court. On the other hand, as you are aware, the Court in Europe says if I am to submit my applications to Europe I have to go through the whole of the procedure here. So if the good Attorney General wants you to make the Order to stop me and you did, you have deprived me not only of my right to be heard in here, you are also depriving me of my right to have remedies and protection for the crimes I and my family have suffered. You are also depriving me of my right to go to Europe because if I go to Europe and they say to me: “You have not finished the procession in England. You go back there”, that is what makes me sound vexatious like you said in my application.

MR JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: Can I say this? The Order does not prevent you from bringing any action it merely requires you to get the leave of the Court.

THE APPLICANT: In your wisdom, your Lordship, I am certain you have spoken something.

MR JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: We must rise we cannot continue this.

THE APPLICANT: At my age I cannot waste another five or ten years in court I have to give it up. Thank you very much for your time.

Back To Queen’s Bench Index
Back To Site Index