Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWHC Admin 808




Royal Courts of Justice


London WC2

Tuesday 9 October 2001

B e f o r e:




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(Computer-aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of

Smith Bernal Reporting Limited

190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG

Telephone No: 0171-421 4040/0171-404 1400

Fax No: 0171-831 8838

Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

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MR W HOSKINS (instructed by THE TREASURY SOLICITOR, LONDON) appeared on behalf of the Claimant.


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(As approved by the Court)

Crown Copyright

1. LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: I will ask Mr Justice Silber to give the first judgment in this case.

2. MR JUSTICE SILBER: Her Majesty's Attorney General applies to this court for an all proceedings order to be made against the defendant, Allen Gordon Barrett, pursuant to section 41 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (as amended). The provisions of that section which are material to this application provide that:

“42.-(1) If, on an application made by the Attorney General under this section, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and persistently and without reasonable ground-

(a) instituted vexatious civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; or

(b) made vexatious applications in any civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or any inferior court, and whether instituted by him or another; or

(c) instituted vexatious prosecutions (whether against the same person or different persons),

the court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a civil proceedings order, a criminal proceedings order or an all proceedings order.”

3. Those terms are then defined in subsection (1A) which says:

“In this section-

“civil proceedings order” means an order that-

(a) no civil proceedings shall without the leave of the High Court be instituted in any court by the person against whom the order is made;

(b) any civil proceedings instituted by him in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the High Court; and

(c) no application (other than one for leave under this section) shall be made by him, in any civil proceedings instituted in any court by any person, without the leave of the High Court;

“criminal proceedings order” means an order that- (a) no information shall be laid before a justice of the peace by the person against whom the order is made without the leave of the High Court; and

(b) no application for leave to prefer a bill of indictment shall be made by him without the leave of the High Court.”

4. The application is, as I have said, for an “all proceedings order” and that is defined as being “an order which has the combined effect of the two other orders.” Those two other orders are a “civil proceedings order” and a “criminal proceedings order”.

5. The basis of this application is that the defendant has pursued three different types of litigation. The first arises out of the sale of his matrimonial home pursuant to an order in the Nuneaton County Court, while the second relates to the proceedings against the solicitor of his former wife. More recently he has commenced a third type of litigation which consists of proceedings against various judges who have been concerned with his earlier litigation. He has attempted to issue criminal proceedings against those judges and to make consequential applications for judicial review when he was unsuccessful.

6. I ought to record that he has told us, and we accept, that he was successful in an action against a garage in 1978 and in a claim against the Department of Transport in 1986. In respect of those three classes of litigation to which I have referred he has not enjoyed any success and, as I will explain, his claims have been characterised as being misconceived in one way or another by various judges who have had to consider them. On four occasions different senior judges have stated that copies of their judgments, relating to the claims made by him, should be sent to the Attorney General for the purpose of making an application for a section 42 order. In the light of the recent attempts by the defendant to issue criminal summonses the Attorney General submits that this is an appropriate case for an “all proceedings order”.


7. This litigation arises out of the apparent inability of the defendant to accept orders of the court in 1977 for the sale of his former home at 32 Derwent Road, Bedworth, Warwickshire (“the Bedworth property”). The defendant was involved in divorce proceedings with his former wife, who subsequently became Mrs Hemming, and who on 21st September 1977 obtained a charging order on that property. That order made in the Nuneaton County Court stated that the sum of £1,972.92 was still due under the charging order and it was ordered that the defendant deliver possession of the Bedworth property by 18th October 1977. It was further ordered that Mrs Hemming's solicitors should arrange the sale of that property on conditions to be approved by the registrar. There was, in addition, a direction at the end of the order that it should cease to have effect if the judgment debt and the costs referred to in the order were paid.

8. At that time, those sums were not paid and on 11th April 1978 the defendant was ordered to vacate the Bedworth property. On 21st June 1978 the registrar ordered that the Bedworth property should be sold at a price of £11,250, or such sum as a particular firm of estate agent should deem a fair figure in the circumstances, but not for a price less than £10,000. The registrar also ordered that the contract of the sale of that property and the transfer be signed by Mr Registrar Kendrick on behalf of the defendant. An application for leave to appeal from this order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

9. As monies under the Charging Order remained outstanding, a contract was duly entered into by the registrar on 19th July 1978 for the sale of the Bedworth property to a Mr Charles, an innocent purchaser, for the sum of £11,250. The contract was in the ordinary form specified in the West Midlands Association of Law Society Contracts For Sale, 1973 edition. Special Condition 2 stated that the date of completion was on or before 1st September 1978.

10. On that date, the defendant paid into court the amounts outstanding under the charging order and he personally resumed possession of the Bedworth property, notwithstanding the order of the court that he should deliver up possession.

11. Committal proceedings were then brought against the defendant who was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for contempt of court for reentering the Bedworth property. Mr Charles was obviously not prepared to complete the purchase on 1st September and he did not actually complete the purchase by payment of the purchase price until 8th September 1978. The defendant had also purported to sell the Bedworth property to his brother.

12. At that stage, as the land was registered, the transfer to Mr Charles still had to be registered, but to stop this happening the defendant made a successful ex parte application to restrain the registration of the Bedworth property to Mr Charles. Slade J granted the injunction over a few days in the usual way in order that the matter could be looked at in greater detail at an inter partes hearing which took place on 9th February 1979. On that occasion, Whitford J refused to continue the injunction. An appeal to the Court of Appeal against Whitford J's decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 20th June 1979.

13. The defendant subsequently made an application in that action (“the second application”) against his former wife and Mr Charles to have the registration set aside and the contract and transfer rescinded. On 29th April 1983, Vinelott J refused to make that order and the defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeal who dismissed the appeal. Dillon LJ (with whom Eveleigh LJ and Kerr LJ agreed) explained that “everything was done normally in this case and Mr Barrett has no ground of complaint”. Mr Barrett then made an unsuccessful application to the House of Lords. It is worth referring to two comments that were made during the course of the proceedings concerning the second application. First, Mr Vinelott concluded that:

“... this whole application is, in my judgment, wholly misconceived. The plaintiff is endeavouring to reopen matters already concluded against him by the decisions of Mr Justice Whitford and the Court of Appeal.”

14. Second, Dillon J in the Court of Appeal explained that the action was “concerned with the inability of Mr Barrett to accept the sale of his former home”. As I will explain, sadly, that inability to accept the sale of the home continues.


15. On 22nd February 1980, the defendant commenced proceedings against the solicitors of his former wife alleging inducement of breach of contract of marriage and breach of their duty of care to his daughter, the second plaintiff in that action. The judgment of Arnold J striking out that action on 6th July 1978 indicates the cause of action of the defendant was that the solicitors for his wife had persuaded the defendant's former wife not to abandon divorce proceedings against him and that they had advised her to cease communication with the defendant that might led to a reconciliation. An appeal against Arnold J's order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 28th July 1978 and that court also refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

16. This failure did not deter the defendant because on 22nd February 1980 he issued a further writ, with his daughter again as co-plaintiff, against the same solicitors with allegations similar to those which had been struck out by Arnold J. That writ was set aside in so far as it purported to claim relief on behalf of his daughter by the district judge. Successive appeals against that order were dismissed by Stephen Brown J on 16th October 1981 and by the Court of Appeal on 30th November, with a subsequent application for permission for leave to appeal to the House of Lords also being refused.

17. On 27th July 1982 the statement of claim, relating to the claim of the defendant, was struck out by Hodgson J on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action or was otherwise frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court. It is noteworthy that Hodgson J concluded his judgment by saying:

“In those circumstances it seems to me that the plaintiff has probably reached a stage where his belief in his right to some form of remedy has ceased to have very much connection with common sense.”

18. On 2nd December 1982 an application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal was dismissed.


19. On 16th February 1994 the defendant issued a writ against Sir Edward Eveleigh, Sir Michael Kerr and Sir Brian Dillon who were the three Lord Justices who had dismissed his appeal from the order of Vinelott J in the second application to which I have already referred. His cause of action was based on allegations of fraud, a criminal conspiracy to defraud and denial of equal protection of the law. It was for aggravated damages, mental damages and exemplary damages.

20. On 29th March 1994 Master Murray dismissed the action as being “doomed to failure”. Mr Robert Englehardt QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge in the Queen's Bench Division dismissed the appeal from Master Murray's order and refused permission to appeal. In reaching his decision Mr Englehardt relied on the well-known principles of judicial immunity, but noted that the defendant “feels a strong sense of grievance”. The attitude of the defendant in that action showed a total inability on his part to accept that he had no longer any claims relating to the sale of the Bedworth property and, more importantly, it indicated a determination to litigate issues even after he had already exhausted all his remedies in relation to them.

21. On 1st June 1988, the defendant applied for leave to judicially review a decision of a stipendiary magistrate, Mr Nicholas Evans, who refused to issue summonses against six people who had been involved in this litigation relating to his divorce and the sale of the Bedworth property. Those included the three Lord Justices who dismissed his appeal against Vinelott J's judgment in the second application, namely Sir Edward Eveleigh, Sir Michael Kerr and Sir Brian Dillon. The defendant had also sought to issue a summons against Mr Englehardt who, as I explained, had dismissed the appeal against the order striking out the defendant's claim against the three Lord Justices. Another defendant was Sir John Vinelott who had made the order in the second application against which the Court of Appeal judges had dismissed his appeal.

22. Finally, the defendant also sought leave to judicially review the decision of the Chief Land Registrar. The allegations giving rise to the application for judicial review refer to “the crimes committed by the stipendiary magistrate, Mr N Evans” and those included:

“... by his partiality and oppression he illegally, wickedly, dishonestly, willfully, fraudulently and knowingly failed to perform his public duty of allowing me to pursue my action for rectification and damages.”

23. On 23rd July 1998 Tucker J sitting as a Crown Office judge refused to grant leave to judicially review the decision of the stipendiary magistrate. He ordered that a copy of his judgment should be sent to the Attorney General so that he could consider whether proceedings should be commenced under section 42 of the 1981 Act. Tucker J said in the course of his judgment that:

“It is perfectly clear to me that the applicant is completely obsessed so that his mind has been taken over by events which took place on the breakdown of his marriage many years ago. In particular, out of the compulsory sale of the applicant's home as a result of an order made in divorce proceedings. Since that time the applicant has engaged persistently in litigation, both civil and now attempts criminal litigation.”

24. The learned judge referred to the allegation made by the defendant and said of them:

“These are most serious allegations to make. They are, in my view, misguided, groundless and outrageous. The applicant's submissions to me have been muddle-headed and inconsequential, although I will say perfectly courteous. The application both to me and in my opinion to the Stipendiary Magistrate was wholly misconceived. I categorise the attempted institution of criminal proceedings as being vexatious.”

25. Tucker J had no hesitation in dismissing the application.

26. Notwithstanding the strength of those comments, the defendant renewed his application for permission to the Divisional Court. In his judgment Collins J (with whom Lord Bingham LCJ agreed) said:

“The reality is that, sadly, Mr Barrett is obsessed with the loss of his house and has been making wild allegations of fraud against anyone who decides anything against him in the context of that loss. He is totally unable to appreciate that his activities before the court are vexatious and are completely lacking in any merit whatever.”

27. The Divisional Court endorsed the decision of Tucker J that the matter should be considered by the Attorney General and it ordered that a copy of its judgments should be sent to the Attorney General for him to consider whether proceedings should be commenced against the defendant under section 42 of the 1981 Act.

28. The defendant then sought to issue summonses for sedition against those who had been involved in the decisions made against him in previous court applications. The defendants were the stipendiary magistrate, Mr Nicholas Evans, Tucker J, Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ and Collins J. He also asked that a summons of sedition should be issued against the Chief Land Registrar. The Clerk to the Justices refused to issue the summonses and the defendant sought permission to judicially review this application.

29. On 2nd December 1999 Elias J refused to give permission characterising the application of the defendant as “totally and entirely hopeless”. He said that it was akin to the application dismissed by Tucker J, to which I have already referred. Elias J explained that:

“Leaving aside questions of judicial immunity, there is absolutely no shred of evidence of any kind that would justify any conceivable inference that the Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and the other judges involved had formed the view, or should have formed the view, that the action of the earlier courts constituted the crime of theft and fraud and such like.”

30. He therefore dismissed the application and ordered that a copy of his judgment be sent to the Attorney General.

31. The defendant renewed his application for permission to the Divisional Court and on 23rd February 2000 it was dismissed. Alliott J giving the judgment of this court endorsed every word of Elias J's judgment and, in particular, that the application was “totally and entirely useless”. Rose LJ, Vice President of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal agreed. The Divisional Court also ordered that the papers should be sent to the Attorney General to determine whether an application should be made under section 42. Against that background the present application is made.


32. The starting point for the Attorney General's submission is that the defendant has had no success with any of his litigation in respect of the three matters which I have outlined. It is also said by Mr Hoskins that the defendant has sought to pursue many of the grievances relating to the sale of his former home by commencing proceedings against parties not connected with that order, such as members of the Court of Appeal who initially dismissed his claims. The Attorney General points out, rightly in my view, that many of the defendant's claims have been criticised in trenchant terms by different judges as having no basis and that those comments are entirely justified. In the light of the defendant's recent attempts to issue criminal summonses, the Attorney General submits that this is an appropriate case for an “all proceedings order”.

33. The defendant has appeared in person and he has put in an affidavit, as well as a helpful written skeleton. He has made oral submissions which he has presented with commendable courtesy. The recurring theme of his argument is that he is right and that the decisions of the court, especially those relating to the sale of the Bedworth property, are all incorrect.

34. It is appropriate at this stage to deal with two submissions that have been made. First, the defendant has submitted that this court has no jurisdiction because of the terms of section 2(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Which provides that:

“2-(1) A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any-


(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the Convention.”

35. I do not think that there is anything in that point whatsoever. The claim is in no way concerned with those matters and I conclude that his contention is misconceived on this point.

36. The second matter of law is a submission made on behalf of the Attorney General that in section 42 proceedings this court should not go behind the decisions which prompted the application. The basis of that submission are the comments made by Sir John Donaldson MR in Attorney General V Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859. The Master of the Rolls (with which Staughton and Stuart Smith LJJ agreed) said:

“The fifth and last issue of law arose out of Mr Jones' wish to challenge the conclusion of various judges in the underlying proceedings that his conduct in those particular proceedings had been vexatious or had involved an abuse of the process of the court. We ruled that he was not free to do so. If any such conclusion was, or was thought by Mr Jones to be, erroneous, the remedy was to appeal in those proceedings or, where it was said that the judgment was vitiated by the fraud of other parties, to take appropriate steps to have the judgment set aside. But if that was not done, the decision must stand and is capable of forming the basis for the court being satisfied upon an application section 42 that Mr Jones had habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground acted in the manner referred to in subsection (1)(a) and/or (b).”

37. Those comments mean that on an application such as this, the court is obliged to regard the judgments relied on by the Attorney General as being correct and they are not open to review by this court at the defendant's request. The defendant, nevertheless, criticises many of the decisions in derogatory and unequivocal language and in his written skeleton argument he repeatedly accused judges and court officials of fraud. It is noteworthy that he refers to about 16 such instances of fraud apart from making other hostile comments. As Sir John Donaldson indicated the appropriate remedy of the defendant in respect of each of the decisions with which he was dissatisfied was either to seek to have the judgment set aside or to appeal against them. What is important is that on this present application this court cannot review or reopen those decisions and must regard them as correct.


38. Having heard the defendant make his submissions it seems quite clear that he still remains hopefully obsessed with his complaints surrounding the sale of his former matrimonial home and the way in which his applications have been dealt with by the courts. I can readily understand how initially he felt he had been unjustly treated by the sale of the Bedworth property, but the legality of that sale was decided many years ago and it has been so decided on more than one occasion. The repeated attempts of the defendant to open up this issue all over again constitute, to my mind, a serious case of vexatious litigation, especially in the light of his sustained attempt to reopen it by seeking redress against some of the judges who have dealt with it. It is striking that in his application today the defendant referred to some of the activities of the judges as being “organised crime”.

39. The defendant suffers from what could only be described as an obsession which has had the effect, as judges in the past have indicated, of detaching him from reality. He appears unable to accept the hopelessness of the claims that he has brought. Indeed he still believes vehemently that he is a party that is wronged and that he is entitled to redress. So, regrettably, he would be unable to appreciate that any future claims raising questions concerning the sale of his former home or the way that it has been dealt with by the courts are doomed to failure.

40. There are two aggravating features of the defendant's conduct. First, he is not merely entirely deluded about the weakness of his cases, but he is also acting, to my mind, maliciously, and with worrying disingenuity in his attempt to bring claims against the judges who give judgments with which he disagrees. Secondly, his claim spanned a very long period of more than 20 years starting in 1978, and it seems that his grievance has not reduced over the years and quite possibly has increased. It is true that during the 1980s there was a lull in the litigation, but in the 1990s he started litigating again.

41. Of course any order which limits the freedom of citizens to bring and pursue civil and criminal proceedings is draconian in nature. Thus any court considering imposing such an order should consider the evidence with particular scrutiny. In appraising the effects and nature of the defendant's previous proceedings that I have described I take into account not merely the oppressive consequences for his unfortunate adversary, but also the wider public interest. Scarce and valuable judicial resources have been used on an unacceptable scale as a result of his misconceived and repetitive litigation which is likely to continue unless restrained by this court. Thus I come to the clear conclusion that this court should exceed to the Attorney General's application and make an order to prevent the defendant continuing to make applications to the court.

42. An additional reason for reaching that conclusion is that the overriding objectives of the CPR include “enabling the courts to deal with cases justly”, (sub rule 1) and this includes so far as practicable:

“... allotting to [any particular case] an appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases.”

43. (Sub rule 2 (E)). Although these objectives are concerned with the interpretation of the CPR, they are of importance in encouraging us to impose a civil proceedings order.

44. In the words of the section it seems clear to me that the defendant has habitually and without reasonable regard instituted vexatious civil proceedings. I am also satisfied that similar comments apply to his attempts to use the criminal courts in his campaign to seek redress, so that the order sought should cover all proceedings.

45. A more difficult question is its length. Section 42(2) of the 1981 Act (as amended) permits an “all proceedings” order to be made for a limited time. It must not be forgotten that the existence of a section 42 order constitutes a serious impediment to commencing proceedings although it would still remain possible to litigate as the judge whose permission must be necessary would merely have to be satisfied under section 42(3) of the 1981 Act that the proposed proceedings:

“... are not an abuse of the process of the court in question and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings or application.”

46. This is not a high threshold and this factor must be borne in mind in determining the length of the section 42 order.

47. To calculate the appropriate period of such an order it is necessary to strike a balance between the need to bring to an end the vexatious use of the courts and the desirability of removing the restriction when it would no longer be likely to serve a useful purpose. The difficult task for any court is to assess the latter date as that entails considering when a litigant will cease to misuse the right to commence proceedings.

48. A useful starting point is to examine the previous conduct of a defendant to see what inferences can be drawn. Until now the defendant has shown an unabated desire to continue to pursue hopeless claims over a period of more than 20 years as I have explained. We still today have to deal with a renewed application for permission for judicial review and that was issued in November 2000.

49. Although this is not a matter relied on by the Attorney General it does seem to us that it would not be sensible to assume that the defendant will not commence all proceedings in the future. We are very conscious that he has been successful on two occasions. But when presenting his case on this application the defendant has demonstrated that he is as aggrieved as ever about the sale of the Bedworth property and those members of the judiciary who do not agree with him. He has made repeated allegations of criminal offences with suggestions that the judges are part of a group of organised crime.

50. I do not believe that his determination to seek redress for his grievances in court will finish in the immediate future. He has, after all, ignored repeated clear judicial warnings about his claims and I have no reason to believe that he will act differently in future. I take into account that he is now aged 62 and that he is a retired managing director who has been successful in two pieces of litigation, as I have explained. Taking all the factors into account, and subject to the views of my Lord, I consider that the appropriate period for an “all proceedings order” against this defendant is 12 years.

51. LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: I agree. In his courteous submissions Mr Barrett says that he has been persistent and tenacious, but not vexatious. He says he has acted extremely reasonably, other than where he might have acted in ignorance of the law. He points to his allegation that his marriage was destroyed by the fraud of a solicitor and that his property was sold to a purchaser who has no title deed. Anyone in that situation, he submits, would make every conceivable application to try and rectify these injustices.

52. I cannot accept these submissions for the reasons given by my Lord. The history, and particularly the recent history of attempts to start criminal proceedings against judges, speaks for itself.

53. There is one footnote which I should add to this judgment. My Lord has already referred to an outstanding application for judicial review. The Attorney General's application to us today did not rely on that further application which was made on 6th November 2000 to quash the two Divisional Court decisions to which my Lord has referred, the first by the Lord Chief Justice and Collins J on 21st October 1998 and the second by Rose LJ and Alliott J on 23rd February 2000. The application for judicial review repeats the allegations of sedition made against the judges concerned and alleges that in some way Article 6 of the European Convention On Human Rights revives his right to make those allegations and all the other applications which he has made in the past. It does not.

54. Harrison J dealt with the application on paper saying “This application is hopeless and vexatious”. The application was renewed and has been listed before us today. But the effect of the order which we have just made is that the application cannot be pursued unless, and I quote again from section 42(3) of the 1981 Act:

“... the High Court is satisfied that the... application [is] not an abuse of the process of the court... and that there are reasonable grounds for the... application.”

55. Neither of those conditions are met in this case, and this should be recorded as a footnote to the judgment which we have given.

56. There is, however, one outstanding point, Mr Hoskins, which I would like your help on. In the bundle we have supplied by your solicitors we do not have the claim form. Perhaps you should look at it in case there is some further or amended claim form which we have not seen. Now you will see that the claim form only asks for a civil proceedings order.


LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: I had not seen that until my Lord started to give judgment. It is right to say that Mr Lutterodt's statement, paragraph 1, says that the statement is made in support of an application for an all proceedings order. He exhibits a certificate from the Attorney General which authorises the making of an application for an all proceedings order and your skeleton and your submissions to us, and indeed Mr Barrett's submissions in reply, were all directed to the question as to whether or not there should be an all proceedings order. But we do need to put the proceedings in proper form and unless there is already an amendment the application should, I think, be amended to make it clear that that is what the application is for. That requires, I think, several amendments to the form.

MR HOSKINS: My Lord, I am grateful.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: I will give Mr Barrett the opportunity to say anything he wants to about it in a moment, but it should be amended and perhaps while I am asking Mr Barrett to say something about it you will consider how it should be amended unless you are able to tell me that there is an amended form already.

MR HOSKINS: Would your Lordship just give me a moment?

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Well, Mr Barrett, you see what has happened.

THE RESPONDENT: Yes, I can see what has happened, my Lord.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: It seems to me that the Treasury Solicitor, unless I am told they have----

MR HOSKINS: My Lord, I am told there is no further form, so this form plainly requires amendments. I am grateful to your Lordship for having pointed that out. I am sorry it was not noticed earlier.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: I hope we would have picked it up if a copy of the claim form had been lodged with us. But the associate showed it to me when my Lord started to give judgment.

MR HOSKINS: May I consider the appropriate amendment?

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Yes. Well, Mr Barrett, that is a point upon which, obviously, there may be some embarrassment in the other camp, but are there any reasons why it should not be amended?

THE RESPONDENT: Well, I would object to it being amended at this stage.


THE RESPONDENT: Because it effectively blocks my hearing, the other hearing, my application for judicial review.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: No, I do not think that is the case.

THE RESPONDENT: You see what I mean, and then after that hearing, my Lord, I expect it would not go through anyway.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: That is a very clever point, Mr Barrett.


LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: But I do not think that is the way we will deal with it. I think it is very obvious from the way the case was put that at all times it was intended to apply for such an order, but for some reason there was what is called sometimes a 'slip in the office'--


LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: --which resulted in the wrong form being used. But let us just consider for a moment, I do not know whether you have a copy of this document or not. I did not see it until a moment ago and there only seems to be one in court. Is there a copy of it there?

MR HOSKINS: I will see if I can obtain a copy.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Mr Barrett ought to have one and we would like one so that we can see what should be done. I think it is fairly obviously, but----

MR HOSKINS: I am able to produce one copy.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Right. Mr Barrett, have you got a copy of it?

THE RESPONDENT: No, I did not bring it with me.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Well, we have another one, so you have this one.

THE RESPONDENT: No, I have found it. I have the original.

MR JUSTICE SILBER: Thank you very much.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Right, well, now, as I say, I think it is fairly obvious. If you look at “take notice... for the Attorney General to apply for..,” After “take notice”, fourth line it should be “all”, “for an all proceedings order”. Then “as amended that”, and 1, 2, 3 follows the section, but we need some more subparagraphs in there to follow -- we simply put in there whatever the two, I seem to have lost it for the moment.


MR HOSKINS: Subsection (1)(a) defines criminal proceedings.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: We need to put in as 4 and 5, (1)(A)(a) and (1)(A)(b).

MR HOSKINS: Yes, my Lord.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: So that becomes: 4 and 5 as per the Act. And “take further notice that the grounds of.... that you habitually persistently.... instituted proceedings in Civil and Criminal Courts.” Right?

MR HOSKINS: My Lord, yes.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: “And further particularised”. Well, you will have leave to amend in that way.

MR HOSKINS: I am grateful, my Lord, and I shall ensure renewed copies.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Will you please submit to the court an amended copy of the claim form and send to Mr Barrett as well the amendments as fully set out?


LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Right, does that conclude what you have to say, Mr Hoskins?

MR HOSKINS: That is all I have to say.


THE RESPONDENT: Have you finished the judgment?


THE RESPONDENT: Could I make application for leave to appeal then on the grounds that section 42 requires a hearing of the person and in my opinion I have not been heard for the reasons you so understandably stated, that you are bound by the various court judgments. So you have refused to hear me effectively on the anarchy by the court and the court's judgment.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Mr Hoskins, can you just help me for a moment? Is the appeal from an all proceedings order an appeal in a criminal cause or matter to the House of Lords or an appeal to the Court of Appeal?

MR HOSKINS: My Lord, my instinct is immediately that it is an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: I think they do go that way. If it was just a criminal proceedings order it would be in a criminal cause or matter, I suspect, and then would probably be the House of Lords. Anyway, you have applied for permission and you say you should have it because we have had to follow a previous decision of the Divisional Court which is wrong, which denied you your right under section 42 to be heard, is that right?

THE RESPONDENT: That is correct, my Lord, yes, but the Court of Appeal is similarly bound, so I cannot effectively get anywhere until I get to the House of Lords.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: I am not sure about that. It is a Divisional Court case, so they would not be----

MR JUSTICE SILBER: It is the Court of Appeal.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: It is the Court of Appeal.

THE RESPONDENT: But in the case of the Jones judgments made by the three Lord Justices in the Court of Appeal--


THE RESPONDENT: --they would be similarly bound.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: That is probably the case, but is there anything more you want to say in support of your submission that you should have permission?

THE RESPONDENT: That is the point in my submission, sir.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: No. Sorry, you will have to seek it in the Court of Appeal, but you have asked for it.

THE RESPONDENT: Thank you very much.

LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: Thank you very much.

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