Neutral Citation Number:  EWHC Admin 594
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CO/1680/2001
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Monday, 23rd July 2001
B e f o r e:
LORD JUSTICE BROOKE
MR. JUSTICE SILBER
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HER MAJESTY'S ATTORNEY GENERAL
KRISHNAN KUMAR ARORA
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MR. B. CARR (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the Claimant.
THE DEFENDANT appeared in Person.
J U D G M E N T
(As Approved by the Court)
Monday, 23rd July 2001
J U D G M E N T
1. LORD JUSTICE BROOKE: This is an application by the Attorney General pursuant to section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (as amended) for a civil proceedings order against Krishnan Kumar Arora. The basis of the application is that Mr. Arora has habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious civil proceedings and made vexatious applications in civil proceedings.
2. Mr. Arora at all material times operated a business which traded under the name Practice Disposal Agency. In the course of this business he involved himself in brokering the sale of accountancy practices by taking steps to ensure introductions of potential sellers and purchasers and claiming a commission on the successful introductions he had made. On a number of occasions those who take advantage of the services of intermediaries like Mr. Arora then deny that the intermediary is entitled to commission. We take into account, in considering the litigation which has been put before us, that Mr. Arora has had to bring proceedings on a number of occasions claiming his commission. From time to time in the proceedings which we have seen (and no doubt on other occasions) he was successful in recovering the commission that was denied to him. It is therefore necessary for us, in considering the matters which the Attorney General has put before us, to determine whether Mr. Arora was simply behaving in a way to which no exception could reasonably be taken, as he was merely asserting his rights, or whether the actions he took in the course of the proceedings can be described in the statutory language of section 42.
3. In considering the evidence, we also have to bear in mind what was decided by the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v. Jones (1990) 1 W.L.R. 859, in which Lord Donaldson M.R. made it clear that a court was not, on an application like this, concerned with the merits or otherwise of the various points taken in the proceedings on which the Attorney General relies. Lord Donaldson said that, in those cases, if a litigant thought the conclusion of the lower court to be erroneous, his remedy was to appeal in those proceedings or, where it was said that a judgment was vitiated by the fraud of other parties, to take appropriate steps to have the judgment set aside. On a number of occasions Mr. Arora maintained that the courts have been deceived by fraud or perjury, and he exercised his right to bring further proceedings in an effort to assert this contention. It is necessary to consider the fate of those further proceedings when deciding the Attorney General's application.
4. There are five main sets of proceedings on which the Attorney General relies. He also relies on a number of smaller matters. The first was the case of Wood and Hicks. In July 1990 Mr. Arora issued a writ against these two defendants, and obtained judgment in February 1994 from Master Miller for £6,250 plus VAT and interest, in total amounting to a sum not short of £10,000. Mr. Hicks appealed, seeking to reduce the principal sum in the judgment to £4,400. The Court of Appeal reduced the total judgment to £6,882.80 and ordered the defendant, Mr. Arora, to pay the costs of the appeal.
5. Two days later, Mr. Arora started new proceedings in the county court against Mr. Hicks. He accused him of deliberately concealing evidence, fabricating and fragmenting the truth, and indulging in distortions amounting to fraudulent misrepresentations. In December 1996, District Judge Weintroub ordered that judgment should be entered for Mr. Arora for £2,247 including VAT and interest in relation to sums which fell due after the issue of the earlier proceedings. He also ordered that the defendant pay 15% of Mr. Arora's costs incurred until a week before that hearing, with the costs thereafter to lie where they fell.
6. On 8th January 1998, Mr. Hicks issued a statutory demand seeking a balance in relation to the sums owed by him to Mr. Arora and by Mr. Arora to him, which was favourable to him in the sum of £3,340. Mr. Arora applied to have that demand set aside. He said that Mr. Hicks was dishonest and had misled court in the litigation. In October 1998 Mr. Registrar Rawson dismissed his application.
7. On 23 November 1998, Mr. Arora issued new proceedings in the High Court against Mr. Hicks. In those proceedings he claimed that Mr. Hicks and/or his solicitor acted fraudulently in obtaining orders from the court. In January 1999 he applied for liberty to serve a notice of appeal against the order of Mr. Registrar Rawson. He claimed that the court had been misled by a Mr. Shepperd on behalf of Mr. Hicks. Mr. Registrar James dismissed that application.
8. The scene then transferred briefly to the Portsmouth County Court where, on 5th February 1999, Judge Linda Davies dismissed an application for leave to appeal out of time against the order of District Judge Weintroub of 12th December 1996. On 18th February 1999 Mr. Arora appealed Judge Davies' judgment to the Court of Appeal. He claimed that the orders which were made in the county court case and in the earlier High Court case had been obtained fraudulently. He said that this was a case of wilful deceit of a judicial tribunal.
9. Newman J., at about the same time, heard two appeals in the original High Court action and an appeal in the subsequent High Court action which had been brought the previous November. On 10th March 1999 he dismissed Mr. Arora's appeals against orders of Master Ellis and Master Trench. He made no order on a review of an order for costs.
10. Mr. Arora appealed against Newman J.'s judgment on 30th March. He complained that Mr. Hicks and his solicitor had committed serious criminal acts and that he was entitled to have the previous order set aside on the grounds of active concealment, material misstatement, serious blunder and matters of that kind. He said he was a victim of racism in the courts. On 1st July 1999 a division of the Court of Appeal composed of Otton L.J. and Robert Walker L.J. dismissed all the outstanding appeals, being the appeals against Newman J.'s order and Judge Davies' order. In those circumstances, it is clear that the Court of Appeal did not consider there was any arguable case on the merits in relation to Mr. Arora's allegations of deceit and concealment.
11. The next litigation concerned Mr. Eastwood. In May 1990 Mr. Arora caused a writ to be issued against Mr. Eastwood and five other defendants. He claimed that he had effected introductions for them and that they had failed to make payments to him. The statement of claim included allegations that the defendants had acted fraudulently and did not have the guts to tell the truth. A number of the defendants applied to have six paragraphs of the Statement of Claim struck out on the basis that they contained wild allegations that were totally unjustified. The court has seen the affidavits sworn by two of these defendants, a Mr. Tait and a Mr. Orchard, in which they take strong exception to these serious allegations being made against them in a document which was publicly available. On 1st October 1990 Master Miller struck out those six paragraphs.
12. The action was transferred to the Brighton County Court in November 1992. On 9th December 1994 Judge Viner made an order granting judgment against two groups of defendants for £3,647 each. She ordered Mr. Arora to pay the costs of all the defendants on the basis that they had tendered the sum claimed before the action began. Mr. Arora appealed to the Court of Appeal. He complained that the defendants and their counsel were guilty of professional misconduct because they had all effectively obtained this order from Judge Viner by fraud and deception practised on the court. He said that it was about time somebody investigated the conduct of the solicitors, accountants and counsel. He said that there was sufficient documentary evidence to charge each of them individually and all of them collectively with daylight robbery.
13. On 1st August 1995 a division of the Court of Appeal consisting of Simon Brown L.J. and Morritt L.J. dismissed this application for permission to appeal. They clearly took the view that there was no realistic prospect of success.
14. The litigation then proceeded in relation to issues of costs. Mr. Arora had a success in the Court of Appeal in July 1998 when he had an order from Judge Hayward that he should pay £5,000 into court as a condition of challenging a district judge's order on taxation varied so that he was no longer required to pay the £5,000.
15. The following year, in September 1999, a District Judge made an order on taxation. In December 1999 Judge Kennedy Q.C. in the county court ordered that Mr. Arora should notify certain of the defendants that he wished to appeal out of time against that order. Mr. Arora appealed against Judge Kennedy's order in January 2000. In his notice of appeal he said that he had appeared in quite a few court cases during the last 18 years, that he had studied quite a few judgments and that he had compared judgments of various judges. He said that he was “as sure as death that this case is a crystal clear example of pernicious and institutional racism in the courts”. He made serious allegations of racial discrimination and fraud.
16. By this time it had come to the attention of the Civil Appeals Office that Mr. Arora was an undischarged bankrupt. An order was made by Master Venne in June 2000 to the effect that his application for permission to appeal should be dismissed unless an indication was obtained from his trustee in bankruptcy in relation to the proceedings. This appeal was then dismissed by order of the Court of Appeal.
17. There was a further order made by Judge Kennedy on 24th February and a further notice of appeal, this time asserting that he had been denied his human rights and that his case would go to the European Court of Human Rights. He also made allegations of pernicious and institutional racism. That appeal was similarly disposed of by the Court of Appeal in June 2000. In relation to the Eastwood actions, Mr. Carr submits that, although Mr. Arora was partially successful, the litigation was characterised by intemperate allegations against the defendants, their legal representatives and the judiciary, and also unsuccessful appeals to the Court of Appeal.
18. The third set of proceedings concerned Mr. and Mrs. Athwal and Mr. Sahi. There were earlier episodes in these proceedings which involved a default judgment in Mr. Arora's favour. This judgment was set aside. On 8th November 1994 Judge Green Q.C., at the Central London County Court, ordered judgment to be entered in Mr. Arora's favour against Mr. Athwal for a sum of just over £3,000. He dismissed his claim against the other two defendants. Mr. Athwal was legally aided, so that Mr. Arora, although successful in obtaining an order for costs against him, obtained the usual order that those costs were not to be enforced without the leave of the court. On the other hand, he was ordered to pay the costs of the other two defendants. He lodged a notice of appeal in which he alleged lies, fraud and deceit by the defendants. The Court of Appeal granted him leave to appeal on one aspect of the matter, namely the liability of Mrs. Athwal, together with an issue relating to the costs order made by Judge Green. At this time Mr. Arora had solicitors acting for him, and on 10th January 1997 his appeal was dismissed by consent.
19. Eleven months later, Mr. Arora issued new proceedings in Bow County Court against these defendants. On 4th June 1998 Judge Platt dismissed this action, with costs, as vexatious. A notice of appeal followed, asserting that Judge Green's judgment could now be re-opened because it was obtained by fraud and perjury.
20. On 4th September 1998 a division of the Court of Appeal consisting of Auld L.J. and Chadwick L.J., after an oral hearing lasting more than an hour, dismissed his application for permission.
21. There were still proceedings continuing in relation to the taxation of the costs of the earlier action. In July 1998 Judge Hornby dismissed Mr. Arora's appeal against an order of the district judge and set a time limit for Mr. Arora to lodge written objections to disputed items. Mr. Arora appealed to the Court of Appeal two days later, contending that the outcome of the earlier proceedings had been tainted by fraud which entitled Mr. Arora to escape from the orders made for the taxation of costs in those proceedings, and he had issued new proceedings to put the injustice right.
22. In November 1998, Mr. Arora not having met the time limit set by Judge Hornby, and not having obtained any stay on Judge Hornby's order, Judge Hornby granted an application made by the defendants to the effect that Mr. Arora's remaining applications concerning the taxation of costs should stand dismissed. He refused Mr. Arora's application for a review.
23. By this time, the Court of Appeal had dismissed Mr. Arora's application for permission to appeal against Judge Platt's order. Nevertheless, in the notice of appeal in November Mr. Arora again alleged perjury and fraud in connection with the original proceedings at the Bow County Court.
24. The same year Mr. Arora also started proceedings in the Luton County Court against the same three defendants. These were struck out by a district judge. In September 1998 Judge Simmons dismissed the appeal, and on 11th September, seven days after Auld L.J. and Chadwick L.J. had dismissed his application for permission to appeal against Judge Platt's order, Mr. Arora issued a further notice of appeal, arguing that he was entitled to relitigate because the Bow County Court proceedings had been tainted by fraud.
25. On 31st March 1999, Henry L.J. and Hidden J. heard all three outstanding appeals by Mr. Arora and dismissed them all, on the basis, no doubt, that they had no real prospect of success.
26. Mr. Arora has addressed us at some length in connection with these proceedings, and has shown us certain documents which he said entitled him in the autumn of 1998 to re-open the matter, because he had just discovered fraud which vitiated the earlier proceedings. Mr. Carr submitted that what Mr. Arora had shown us would have been evident at the original trial before Judge Green, where answers were obtained which went contrary to statements made in a witness statement by one of the defendants in support of his application to have the original statutory demand and default judgment set aside. However that may be, Henry L.J. and Hidden J. in March 1999, and Auld L.J. and Chadwick L.J. in September 1998, dismissed Mr. Arora's attempts to re-open the matters. This court cannot now re-open them in accordance with the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v. Jones.
27. The fourth set of proceedings on which the Attorney General relies relate to Mr. Joseph and Mr. Simon. Mr. Arora in this case claimed the commission which was due to him. In February 1994 Mr. Recorder Grobel dismissed the action with costs on Scale 1 following a trial of the action. In March 1994 Mr. Arora filed a notice of appeal. He contended that the defendants and their solicitors were in contempt of court and that they had deliberately concealed a document from the court. That appeal came before a division of the Court of Appeal consisting of Swinton Thomas L.J. and Morritt L.J. in March 1995, when they dismissed the appeal.
28. In December 1995 Mr. Simon issued a statutory demand against Mr. Arora in relation to his costs in both courts. Mr. Arora applied to have the demand set aside, and in his affidavit in support he referred to fresh proceedings he had brought in the Uxbridge County Court which had been struck out the previous month by Judge Edwards as being frivolous and vexatious. In this affidavit he referred to the conduct of the defendants as amounting to fraud and actions equivalent to mugging.
29. On 9th May 1996 Mr. Registrar James dismissed Mr. Arora's application to have the statutory demand set aside, although he upheld it only in relation to the sums ordered on taxation in the proceedings in the Court of Appeal. The taxation order in proceedings in relation to the county court costs had not been finalised, and so to that extent the amount of the statutory demand was reduced.
30. Five months earlier, in December 1995 Mr. Arora had appealed against Judge Edwards' order. His appeal included a request that Mr. Recorder Grobel's order in February 1994 should be set aside. He accused the Court of Appeal of having “blindly rubber-stamped the lower Court's decision” and he said that the courts were “being run like friendly societies and private clubs ... The deeper you dig into [it the] more dirt you shall find, you shall find unacceptable faces of Defendants, Solicitors, Counsels and Judges”.
31. In April 1996 the Court of Appeal adjourned Mr. Arora's application to enable him to provide further documents. They directed the matter to be relisted not before 22nd April 1996. It appears from Mr. Registrar James' judgment the following month that the Court of Appeal then dismissed his appeal.
32. In December 1996 Judge Edwards made an order varying the amount ordered on taxation in relation to one of the witness allowances claimed, and ordered Mr. Arora to pay costs. In January 1997 he appealed to the Court of Appeal and sought to re-open matters relating to the order as to costs made at the trial in February 1994. On 24th April 1997 a division of the Court of Appeal consisting of Waite L.J. and Potter L.J. dismissed his appeal. The costs in the original proceedings were retaxed and a sum of just over £7,000 was ordered. Mr. Arora failed to pay, and a new statutory demand was issued in April 1997. This included reference to the fact that the Court of Appeal costs of just over £3,000 were still unpaid.
33. In the same month Mr. Arora applied to have that statutory demand set aside. He said that there appeared to be large-scale fraud in this case. He said that it was as unlawful as mugging, and all the conspirators to this criminal act who had obtained this order by fraud and deception needed to be punished. He again sought to have Mr. Recorder Grobel's order set aside. On 28th April Mr. Registrar James dismissed this application.
34. In July 1997 Judge Edwards made an order that the costs of the Brentford action should be reduced to a sum of just under £7,000. Mr. Arora failed to pay, and a new statutory demand was issued in August 1997. Mr. Arora then applied to have that demand set aside, alleging perjury, fraud and deception, and made a further effort to re-open the recorder's order. On 29th August 1997 Mr. Registrar Boister dismissed this application. In a manuscript note he made on the face of this application, he said that the demand was based on judgments and orders, and that the court was not a forum in which to relitigate matters that had already been disposed of by another court.
35. In June 1997 Judge Edwards made a further order in relation to costs in the original proceedings. Mr. Arora issued a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal, suggesting that the court had been misled by the defendants in that action. On 14th July 1997 a division of the Court of Appeal consisting of Simon Brown L.J. and Mummery L.J. refused permission to appeal. On 15th July, the following day, Mr. Arora issued another notice of appeal against the order of Judge Edwards relating to costs, and on 12th February 1999 a division of the Court of Appeal consisting of Evans L.J. and Hidden J. dismissed his application for permission to appeal.
36. We have been supplied with a judgment of Evans L.J. on this occasion. He said at the end of the judgment:
“I have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Arora has failed totally to demonstrate any point of principle or of law or any substantial error by the judge such as would justify this court even contemplating giving leave to appeal. Mr. Arora with his experience of litigation must realise that the Court of Appeal is not here to be appealed to in cases where the trial judge has given very careful and detailed consideration to the matters in issue and has not, on the face of it, made any error of law or any serious error. I would regard this application as coming close to an abuse of the process of the court, which allows for appeals in those exceptional circumstances. It is nowhere near an exceptional case and I would refuse this application.”
37. So far as this matter is concerned, Mr. Carr says that both these County Court actions were unsuccessful, the five appeals to the Court of Appeal were unsuccessful and there were three unsuccessful applications to set aside statutory demands. He submits that Mr. Arora was constantly attempting to re-open the recorder's original order, asserting fraud and perjury, and the Court of Appeal was consistently refusing to allow him to re-open it, even though he had set out his complaints clearly.
38. The fifth substantive matter in which the Attorney General relies is the case of Brewster. This was a case which started in the High Court in May 1991 and transferred to the Newcastle County Court in April 1995, where Mr. Recorder Goss dismissed the action with costs. In May 1995 Mr. Arora filed a notice of appeal, complaining, among other things, that the defendants had fabricated their evidence and that the judge not been true to his judicial oath. In November 1995 a division of the Court of Appeal consisting of Russell L.J. and Schiemann L.J. dismissed his application for permission to appeal.
39. In 1998 Mr. Arora issued a writ in the High Court against Mr. Brewster and a Mr. Jackson, who was in some way connected with Mr. Johnson in the original matter. Mr. Michael Kallipetis Q.C. made an order striking out those proceedings, and in April 1999 Mr. Arora filed a notice of appeal. He alleged pernicious and institutional racism at every stage of litigation. He said that the solicitor was committing fraud and the judges were turning a blind eye, and that the judges were bending and twisting the rules and applying them out of context to achieve a miscarriage of justice.
40. On 16th April 1999 Mr. Arora was made bankrupt. The Official Solicitor was added to the list of respondents. On 22nd July 1999 Mrs. Williamson Q.C., sitting as a deputy judge, dismissed an appeal against the bankruptcy order. In July 1999, a week later, Mr. Arora appealed against Mrs. Williamson's order, complaining of institutional racism. On 1st November 1999 a division of the Court of Appeal consisting of Morritt L.J. and Jonathan Parker L.J. refused permission to appeal and directed that the matter be referred to the Attorney General for his consideration. I will come back to that part of the history in a moment.
41. Two days earlier Mr. Peter Leaver Q.C., sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, had dismissed an appeal by Mr. Arora against a registrar's order in the bankruptcy, and rejected an application for a stay. On 19th September 1999 Mr. Arora filed a notice of appeal against Mr. Leaver's order. He sought disciplinary proceedings against the defendants, against their legal representatives, against the masters and against the judges concerned in this litigation. He said that they were all involved in deliberate and serious breaches of Articles 6, 10 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He suggested that racism was rampant in the United Kingdom judicial system, and that he had been the victim of criminally insane orders. On 31st March 2000 Robert Walker L.J. dismissed this application for permission to appeal.
42. Reverting to the order made by Morritt L.J. on 1st November 1999, it is to be noticed that this continual flurry of litigation throughout 1999 in the Brewster matter followed the very clear warning that Evans L.J. had given Mr. Arora earlier in the year.
43. The Attorney General has also relied on a number of other matters. In a case involving a Mr. Silver, a statutory demand had been served on Mr. Arora. Mr. Arora's application to have it set aside was based on allegations of fraud and dishonesty. This application was unsuccessful. There was an unsuccessful appeal to Lloyd J., and a further action was started in that case.
44. The Attorney General then referred to proceedings relating to Messrs. Lum and Phillips. They showed a similar history to some of the proceedings to which I have referred, but Mr. Arora has shown us that on 26th February 1997 the original judgment in the earlier proceedings was set aside and judgment was entered by consent for him. He says that this was an example of a case in which defendants he had sued had not put the full picture before the court. He submits that in the earlier proceedings the court had swallowed the untrue story that the defendants had told the court and that it was only by bringing the fresh proceedings that he was able to have justice done.
45. The Attorney General also referred to proceedings against a Mr. Edwards and others. In my judgment, no reliance can be properly placed on those proceedings. Mr. Arora had proceedings struck out because he arrived late at court in front of Judge Harris Q.C. in 1996. For some reason, the proceedings then stood in the Civil Appeals Office for a number of years and were then dismissed, not on the merits, but in the course of the Civil Appeals Office's practice of making orders against him once they knew that he was bankrupt, thus inviting the trustee in bankruptcy to intervene. That appeal was dismissed in those circumstances.
46. The Attorney General also relies on proceedings against Mr. Erdozian and others. Judge Byrt Q.C. dismissed the proceedings against nine of the ten defendants in this case for want of prosecution in August 1997. The Attorney General relies on features of the notice of appeal in which Mr. Arora alleged that the hearing had been a charade and the court had been misled. A division of the Court of Appeal consisting of Millett L.J. and Simon Brown L.J. dismissed this appeal at the permission stage. Mr. Arora had instructed counsel on that occasion and was unable to persuade the court that there was any real prospect of success.
47. The Attorney General also relies on an application made by Mr. Arora for judicial review of the decision of the appeals committee of his professional body to consider complaints which were made against him by Mr. Simon and Mr. Joseph. Potts J. rejected that application. He renewed his application to the Court of Appeal, and a division of that court, consisting of Kennedy L.J., Millett L.J. and Ward L.J., dismissed that application as having no prospect of success.
48. The Attorney General also relies on proceedings concerning a Mr. Zervides. Mr. Arora addressed us on that matter at some length. It appears that he was continuing the proceedings despite having been made a bankrupt. There were complicated issues in the proceedings relating to the viability of suggestions that his case had been automatically struck out or that it had been dismissed for want of prosecution. He appealed to the Court of Appeal. That application was never heard on the merits, and it appears to me that it would be wrong to place any reliance on those matters.
49. Mr. Arora has also shown us a judgment of the Court of Appeal in a case involving Mr. Harland and others. We have been shown the judgment of Rose L.J. and Judge L.J. Rose L.J. starts his judgment by saying that Mr. Arora had lodged a notice of appeal containing 113 grounds, of which perhaps two or three were arguable. I have very much borne in mind the problems that Mr. Arora creates for himself by issuing very long notices of appeal. On that occasion, the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Arora's appeal and directed that the matter should be retried by a circuit judge. Mr. Arora has shown us the judgment in his favour following the order for a retrial. So that was a case in which the Court of Appeal had ruled in his favour after hearing argument and his consequent application was successful.
50. Mr. Arora has also shown us a clause in a contract which he now offers to his clients. The circumstances in which, as an undischarged bankrupt, he is continuing to trade are not at all clear to me. No doubt they are proper, but he says that, because these agreements contain a clause referring all disputes to arbitration and entitling him to have the costs in all disputes, the Attorney General should not be worried that he is likely to issue any further applications in the courts.
51. That is the history of the matter, and it is for this court to determine whether the Attorney General has satisfied us that, on this evidence, it can properly be said that Mr. Arora's conduct can be described as habitual,persistent and without any reasonable grounds and whether the civil proceedings or the applications that he made in the course of them can properly be described as vexatious.
52. I bear in mind a number of the points that Mr. Arora made to us in his submissions. I also take into account his complaints that he has been subjected to institutional racism and his complaints that there are breaches of human rights and bad conduct which need independent investigation outside the ranks of the judiciary.
53. So far as the merits of all these matters are concerned, I have referred as I went through the history to the number of different judges in the Court of Appeal who have handled these matters. A large number of different judges in the Court of Appeal from time to time considered the complaints that Mr. Arora had made. I also bear in mind the occasions on which the judges in the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Arora's appeals in whole or in part.
54. I have to determine whether the Attorney General has made out his complaint, bearing in mind the high standard of proof required of him, even though these are civil proceedings. In my judgment the Attorney General has satisfied me that the conduct of Mr. Arora which I have described can properly be stigmatised in the language of section 42. Not only would he never take “no” for an answer, but again and again he made further applications seeking to raise issues which had already been decided against him. He did not restrain himself in the language he used, either in relation to the conduct of the defendants and their legal advisers but also in relation to the conduct of the judiciary. The judiciary have broad shoulders and such allegations get made against judges from time to time. It is critical that, when they are made in a court, they should be considered carefully, because it would be a bad day for justice if large numbers of litigants lost confidence in the independence and fairness of the judges who decide cases in this country.
55. I am completely satisfied that Mr. Arora's conduct, which went on, as I have said, throughout 1999, even though he had been given a clear warning by Evans L.J. and even though he had been made bankrupt, is such that a civil proceedings order must be made.
56. The question which I have to decide next is whether the order should be a life-long order or whether it should be limited in time. Mr. Arora has challenged the jurisdiction of the court under the European Convention on Human Rights to make orders of this kind in section 42 proceedings. In the case of Ebert v. Official Receiver & Ors.  EWCA Civ 340, Buxton L.J. explained why applications and orders of this kind were permitted by the European Court of Human Rights, because a court is of course entitled to control its process. On the other hand, courts have a duty under the Convention jurisprudence to make orders which are proportionate to the matters complained of. In some cases the court continues to make a life-long order. In this case, in my judgment an order of 12 years would be appropriate to ensure that this nuisance does not continue. I would very much hope that in 12 years' time Mr. Arora does not attempt to return to this kind of activity. Otherwise I have no doubt that the Attorney General will return to court and seek a new order.
57. I consider that a civil proceedings order limited to 12 years ought to be made.
MR. JUSTICE SILBER: I agree.
MR. CARR: My Lord, there is no application for costs, my Lord, so I seek an order in the terms of the application which is limited to the period of 12 years which your Lordship has indicated is appropriate.
MR. ARORA: May I have leave to appeal?
LORD JUSTICE BROOKE: We refuse leave to appeal.
Attorney General v Arora (Court of Appeal)
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